image-scan kept HARD-failing on lodash 4.17.19 (CVE-2021-23337, CVE-2026-4800)
and minimist 1.2.5 (CVE-2021-44906) even after the cdxgen 12.3.3→12.5.1 bump,
which only rebuilt the cdxgen layer. A fresh local install of cdxgen 12.5.1
and of npm 11.14.1 — the image's only two npm-package installers — pulls
neither package, and these CVEs were never in .trivyignore, yet image-scan
passed on #404/#405. The vulnerable copies therefore live in a stale, earlier
`scope=worker` cache layer (a non-deterministic npm-install resolution cached
long ago), not in anything the current Dockerfile produces.

Bumping the buildx GHA cache scope (worker → worker-v2) abandons the poisoned
cache and forces a single clean rebuild; the new namespace caches the clean
tree. Keeps the cdxgen 12.5.1 bump (latest 12.x, verified lodash/minimist-free).

…rker image-scan (#407)

A no-cache linux/amd64 rebuild of the worker image (image-scan gate) HARD-fails
on three node-pkg findings vendored under cdxgen's global install tree:
  - lodash 4.17.19   CVE-2021-23337 (HIGH), CVE-2026-4800 (HIGH)
  - minimist 1.2.5   CVE-2021-44906 (CRITICAL)

These are pulled by a platform-gated (cpu=x64/os=linux) transitive of cdxgen's
dependency graph: a fresh `npm install -g @cyclonedx/cdxgen@12.3.3` on
linux/amd64 resolves them, while the same install on arm64/macOS resolves
neither — so they were masked by the cached worker layer (image-scan passed on
#404/#405) and surfaced only once that GHA cache evicted and CI did a clean
amd64 rebuild. It is a pre-existing, main-wide latent issue, unrelated to any
one feature PR.

Add .trivyignore entries following the file's policy (CVE + target + CVSS +
reach analysis + re-evaluate date). All three are UNREACHED: cdxgen is invoked
only for dependency enumeration with a fixed argv, never calls lodash.template
on scanned-repo input, and the worker never invokes lodash/minimist directly.
Re-evaluate when cdxgen ships a fixed vendored tree.

* feat(scan): external CycloneDX SBOM ingest endpoint

Add POST /v1/projects/{id}/sbom-ingest so external tools (CI, cdxgen-based
scanners) can upload an already-generated CycloneDX SBOM; TRUSCA runs the
back half of the scan pipeline against it — persist components → trivy sbom
matching → findings — reusing the Scan model so ingested scans get ref-keyed
retention, the per-project active-scan guard, and the existing
Components/Vulnerabilities/Licenses UI and build gate for free.

This is NOT a Dependency-Track compatible surface: it is a TRUSCA-native
endpoint (Authorization: Bearer, field `sbom`, no autoCreate), not DT's
/api/v1/bom + X-Api-Key.

Endpoint / service (services/sbom_ingest_service.py, api/v1/sbom.py):
- multipart sbom + ref + release; 202 ScanPublic (kind="sbom").
- require_role_or_api_key("developer"); project-scoped key must match.
- Reuses trigger_scan's guards via an extracted prepare_scan_target
  (existence/team 404/403 before archived 409 / cap 429 — authz before state).
- Synchronous adversarial validation of untrusted input: bounded read
  (SBOM_INGEST_MAX_BYTES, 32 MiB → 413), content-type/filename allow-list
  (415), JSON + CycloneDX structure whitelist (422), component cap
  (SBOM_INGEST_MAX_COMPONENTS, 50k → 422), and an O(n) string-aware byte
  nesting-depth pre-check so a deeply nested document is a clean 422 instead
  of a RecursionError → 500 from json.loads. RFC 7807 throughout.
- Atomic: flush wins the active-scan race before the file is written; a 409
  loser writes no file; commit-race deletes the file; enqueue failure → 503.

Celery task (tasks/ingest_sbom.py, enqueue branch + include):
- ingest_sbom_task reuses persist_sbom_components → run_trivy_sbom →
  persist_trivy_findings → mark_succeeded (ref-keyed supersede). Preserves the
  uploaded SBOM as a durable sbom_cyclonedx ScanArtifact for the signature
  surface; containment-guards the path under workspace_root().

Security (Producer-Reviewer findings addressed):
- bind_audit_team before the scan INSERT so the audit row carries team_id.
- disk-write failure → 503 SbomIngestStorageError (retryable), not 422.
- release / original_filename length-capped + control-byte stripped.

Tests: pure adversarial validator unit suite (incl. depth-bomb regression),
endpoint permission×state matrix + new existence-hide-state 409 rows,
realistic multi-CVE fixture pipeline test. Docs: EN/KO ci-integration/sbom-upload.

* test(scan): regenerate OpenAPI snapshot for sbom-ingest endpoint

The OpenAPI contract snapshot test (test_openapi_no_drift) flagged the new
POST /v1/projects/{project_id}/sbom-ingest path. Add it to the committed
snapshot — path param project_id only (sbom/ref/release are requestBody).

* fix(worker): bump cdxgen 12.3.3 → 12.5.1 to bust stale image-scan node-pkg layer

image-scan (worker) HARD-failed on 3 node-pkg findings — lodash 4.17.19
(CVE-2021-23337, CVE-2026-4800) and minimist 1.2.5 (CVE-2021-44906) — that
live under @cyclonedx/cdxgen/node_modules. Reproduction in node:20-bookworm
shows cdxgen 11.x bundles both, while 12.3.3 AND 12.5.1 ship neither: a clean
build already lacks them, so the failure was a stale type=gha scope=worker
cache layer serving the pre-12.x install tree (same class as the earlier
php-symfony image-scan incident).

Bumping the version interpolated into the global npm install changes that
layer's cache key, forcing a fresh (clean) install — root-cause removal, not
a .trivyignore suppression (suppressing a package absent from a clean build
would wrongly mute a future regression). cdxgen invocation is unchanged across
12.3.3→12.5.1 and engines.node still allows ^20, so no scan regression. Fixes
main too (shared cache) once merged.

* fix(ci): bump worker image-scan GHA cache scope to force a clean rebuild

image-scan kept HARD-failing on lodash 4.17.19 (CVE-2021-23337, CVE-2026-4800)
and minimist 1.2.5 (CVE-2021-44906) even after the cdxgen 12.3.3→12.5.1 bump,
which only rebuilt the cdxgen layer. A fresh local install of cdxgen 12.5.1
and of npm 11.14.1 — the image's only two npm-package installers — pulls
neither package, and these CVEs were never in .trivyignore, yet image-scan
passed on #404/#405. The vulnerable copies therefore live in a stale, earlier
`scope=worker` cache layer (a non-deterministic npm-install resolution cached
long ago), not in anything the current Dockerfile produces.

Bumping the buildx GHA cache scope (worker → worker-v2) abandons the poisoned
cache and forces a single clean rebuild; the new namespace caches the clean
tree. Keeps the cdxgen 12.5.1 bump (latest 12.x, verified lodash/minimist-free).

* Revert "fix(ci): bump worker image-scan GHA cache scope to force a clean rebuild"

This reverts commit a17e5fa.

* Revert "fix(worker): bump cdxgen 12.3.3 → 12.5.1 to bust stale image-scan node-pkg layer"

This reverts commit 20a3040.